Does entrepreneurship cause local employment and wage growth, and if so, how large is the impact? Empirical analysis of such question is difficult because of the joint determination of entrepreneurship and economic growth. This paper uses two different sets of variables -the homestead exemption levels in state bankruptcy laws from 1975 and the share of MSA overlaying aquifers -to instrument for entrepreneurship and examine urban employment and wage growth between 1993 and 2002. Despite using different sets of instrumental variables, the ranges of 2SLS estimates are surprisingly similar. A ten percent increase in the birth of small businesses increases MSA employment by 1.1 to 2.2%, annual payroll by 3.1 to 4.0%, and wages by 1.8 to 2.0% after ten years. Furthermore, an accounting exercise shows that the employment and payroll growth from entrepreneurship are not confined to the newly created businesses but spillover to the aggregate urban economy.
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Introduction
Policy makers and scholars frequently emphasize the importance of entrepreneurship for economic growth. However, surprisingly few research empirically examine and quantify entrepreneurship's impact on growth, and justifiably so -forces that drive economic growth also drive entrepreneurship, and exogenous changes in entrepreneurship are hard to find. Furthermore, randomized experiments on entrepreneurship, at scales large enough to examine economic growth, would be difficult to implement to say the least. The literature has had more success in identifying the determinants of entrepreneurship, which range from financing (Kerr and Nanda 2009, Samila and Sorenson 2011), housing collateral (Adelino et al. 2015 , Bracke et al. 2013 , families (Bertrand and Schoar 2006) , and to peers (Lerner and Malmendier 2014) . This paper, unlike the above studies which examine entrepreneurship as an outcome, empirically examines the impact of entrepreneurship on urban growth.
Recently, Glaeser, Kerr, and Kerr (2015) examined entrepreneurship's impact on urban growth using proximity to mines in 1900 as instrumental variables for average establishment size, and found that cities with smaller average establishment size have higher employment growth. I add to this nascent literature by providing additional ways to measure and identify entrepreneurship's impact on growth.
Finding exogenous variation in entrepreneurship is challenging. I use two different sets of instrumental variables to generate plausibly exogenous variation in entrepreneurship across cities. The first set of instrumental variables is the homestead exemption levels set by state bankruptcy laws in 1975.
States varied widely in the degree to which debtors could avoid paying creditors back when filing for personal bankruptcy and such variation dates back to the nineteenth century. Posner et al. (2001) point out that the variation in the state's desire to promote migration in the 19 th century and the legislative negotiation process, where negotiation starts based on initial exemption levels, caused state exemption levels to persist over a long period of time. The unobserved city growth potential in the 1990s, controlling for initial economic conditions and entrepreneurship, is unlikely to be correlated with the homestead exemption levels in 1975 which were influenced by events in the 19 th century. Despite the long historical lag of the homestead exemption variables, claiming instrument exogeneity with certainty is an inherent challenge when using instrumental variables. I alleviate such concern by introducing a very different instrumental variable -the share of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) overlaying aquifers -and show that the 2SLS estimates are quite similar in magnitude, whichever instrumental variable I use.
Aquifers are major storehouses of underground water and facilitate agricultural production. Hornbeck and Keskin (2015) find that counties that overlay with aquifers see substantial increases in the agricultural labor force. If a large part of the MSA population expands in the agricultural sector, there would be less incentive and training for workers to venture out and start new businesses. Furthermore, the financial sector may be more prone to lend to the established agricultural sector. Glaeser, Kerr, and Kerr (2015) ! hypothesize and show that large resource-intensive activities like mining crowd out entrepreneurial activity. Similarly, I find that large water-intensive agricultural production decreases local entrepreneurship.
The literature has often used average establishment size to measure entrepreneurship in cities.
Since most entrepreneurship is associated with small businesses, average establishment size serves as a reasonable proxy for entrepreneurship in cities. However, average establishment size likely contains other information, e.g., the degree of competition in an area. In measuring entrepreneurship, I focus on a more direct measure, i.e., small business births in cities, but also use average establishment size to measure entrepreneurship and compare results with the findings in the related literature. Recent research highlights the importance of new small businesses for economic growth. Haltwinger et al. (2013) , using the Census
Longitudinal Business Dynamics data, examine the universe of all firms and establishments in the US and find that once firm age is controlled for smaller businesses grow no faster than larger businesses. They find that the main source of employment growth is attributed to small and young businesses. Neumark et al. (2011) also find similar results using the National Establishment Time Series data. Even though only a subset of new small businesses survives, small businesses significantly contribute to the creation of jobs. I find that this pattern holds even at the aggregate city level. The creation of new small businesses drives urban growth rather than the expansion of larger firms.
I construct a panel of MSAs and examine the impact of entrepreneurship in 1993 on urban growth between 1993 and 2002. Given that many small firms die out and economic growth is assessed on longer intervals, I focus on the impact of entrepreneurship after 5 or 10 years. I first document that cities with unlimited or higher exemption levels in 1975 have significantly more business births in 1993 even when controlling for the initial conditions for growth, such as employment, population, income, housing price, and education. Using the homestead exemption levels in state bankruptcy laws from 1975 as instrumental variables, I find that a ten percent increase in small business births in 1993 increases urban employment by 1.1 to 2.2%, annual payroll by 3.1 to 4.0%, and wage by 1.8 to 2.0% after ten years. When I use the aquifer share variable as the instrumental variable, I find that the MSAs that overlay with aquifers more have significantly lower small business births and the 2SLS estimates indicate that a ten percent increase in small business birth increases urban employment by 1.8 to 2.1%, annual payroll by 4.0 to 4.7%, and wage by 1.9 to 2.9% after ten years. The fact that two different sets of instrumental variables return similar ranges of estimates further supports the statistically significant and economically meaningful impact of entrepreneurship on urban growth. These results are robust to additional controls of business environment, such as the minimum wage and the Right-to-work law, past population, and the industry composition of cities. The instrumental variable regression estimates are smaller than the OLS estimates, which confirm that unobserved city level growth potentials that increase entrepreneurial activity across ! cities are biasing the OLS estimates upward. Finally, I find that there are agglomeration benefits to
entrepreneurship. An accounting exercise at the city level indicates that the employment and payroll growth from entrepreneurship are not confined to the newly created businesses but spillover to the aggregate urban economy.
Framework for Estimating the Impact of Entrepreneurship on Urban Growth
I introduce entrepreneurship to a standard model of urban growth (Glaeser et al. 1992 , Henderson et al. 1995 to guide the empirical framework. Consider a representative firm in a city at time t where production is specified as and land, and hence will not be able to capture change in wage or employment due to labor substituting technological advances. I note that city subscripts are dropped in the description of the model for expositional brevity. Within this stylized framework, labor is paid the value of marginal product where output price is normalized to one, returning the labor demand function
Putting this in a dynamic framework the growth of employment in a city can be represented as
where ∆ ln ! ! = ln ! !!! − ln ! ! , and similarly for the other variables. I specify the growth of the technology as:
where e t is aggregate entrepreneurship in the city at time t. N t is the size of the city measured by population capturing traditional agglomeration externalities, and ini t represents initial economic condition that might explain growth of technology in the city, such as, initial employment, income, cost of living, and education level. ! is the national growth rate of technology that is constant across cities.
I assume an upward sloping labor supply curve ! ! = ! ! ! ! , ! > 0. The upward sloping labor supply relaxes the perfect labor mobility and the cross-city wage equalization assumptions often used in the literature and allows workers to have preferences for cities. Hence, wage growth is no longer constant at the national level but can vary across cities. Incorporating labor supply into (1) and (2) returns the reduced form equations:
The main empirical test will be to examine whether entrepreneurship indeed promotes the growth of city employment and wages, i.e., whether well as a new establishment in the data. Hence, firm birth would be an ideal proxy. However, for firms, especially multi-establishment firms, the relation between geography and economic measures (employment, payroll) is more obscure, whereas for establishments, there is always a one to one matching between location and employment (or payroll). Hence, a common proxy used to measure entrepreneurship over a fixed geography (MSA or county) is average establishment size over that geography (Glaeser et al. 2010 (Glaeser et al. , 2012 . Since most entrepreneurship is associated with small businesses, average establishment size serves as a reasonable proxy for entrepreneurship and the establishment level data links economic activity of businesses to a location in a straightforward way. One concern could be that average establishment size could contain other information, i.e., the degree of competition in an area.
A more direct measure of entrepreneurship, the birth of businesses, has also been used in the literature but as the dependent variable rather than an independent variable (Rosenthal and Strange 2003, Samila and Sorenson 2011) . This paper will use birth of small businesses in the metropolitan area as the main measure for entrepreneurship. I also use average establishment size as an alternative measure for entrepreneurship, and compare results with the existing literature.
In practice, I run regressions following the model: annual payroll, or wage) so that ∆ ln ! !,!""#!!""! is the change in log employment or income between 1993 and 2002 for city i. Annual payroll includes all wages, salary, bonuses, and benefits paid to employees in the MSA. Wage is calculated as annual payroll divided by employment. ln ! !,!""# is the log of entrepreneurship measured by small business births or average establishment size in 1993. ! !,!""# is the vector of base control variables, which include log employment in 1993, log median family income in 1990, log population in 1990, percent college educated and above in 1990, and the housing price index in 1993. ! ! is the set of census division dummy variables.
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The fundamental difficulty in retrieving an unbiased estimate of ! in equation (4) is the joint determination of urban entrepreneurial activity and urban economic growth. Cities with more growth potentials will likely see higher levels of entrepreneurial activity, which would render the estimate of ! upward biased in equation (4). The challenge of generating a plausibly exogenous variation of entrepreneurship has hampered the development of the causal investigation of the impact of entrepreneurship on economic growth. Finding a plausibly exogenous variation in entrepreneurship is challenging. I use two different sets of instrumental variables -the homestead exemption levels set by state bankruptcy laws in 1975 and the share of the MSA overlaying aquifers -to generate plausibly exogenous variation in entrepreneurship across cities. I discuss the details of these instrumental variables in Section 4.
Data and Variables
To examine the impact of entrepreneurship on urban growth, I construct a city level panel of 
The Impact of Entrepreneurship on Urban Growth
OLS Results
I first visually examine the relationship between entrepreneurship and urban employment growth. Table 2 control for initial employment, median family income, population, percent college educated and above, and the house price index. The main variable of interest is log small business birth, my main measure for entrepreneurship. In later tables I also use average establishment size to measure entrepreneurship.
Column (1) indicates that a 10 percent increase in small business birth is associated with a 2 percent higher employment, 2.7 percent higher payroll, and 0.7 percent higher wages after 10 years. All coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Not only is there employment growth, there is also wage growth from entrepreneurship. In column (2) I include the log establishment births by medium (20 to 499 employees) and large (500 or more employees) firms as controls. The birth of establishments by the larger firms represents expansions from existing firms. The contribution of establishment births by the expansion of larger firms on employment growth is considerably smaller. In examining the impact of small business births, the number of births relative to the number of initial establishments in the city could matter for growth. Also, there could be mean reversion in the number of establishments within MSAs. Hence, in columns (3) and (4) I control for the log number of establishments in 1992 for the three employee size categories. The coefficient estimates on small business births increase and the coefficient estimates on the expansion of medium and large firms become smaller and insignificant. Despite the large number of control variables unobserved regional characteristics could explain the variation in city growth. In columns (5) and (6) I add the nine census division dummies as fixed effects. Focusing on column (5), a 10 percent increase in small business birth is associated with 2.7 percent higher employment and 3.6 percent higher payroll after 10 years. The larger coefficient estimates on entrepreneurship for payroll growth than those for employment growth imply that wage increases with entrepreneurship. Panel C confirms this pattern. A 10 percent increase in small business birth results in about 1 percent higher wages after 10 years. The coefficient estimates on the log initial number of small establishments and log employment in Panel A are negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with mean reversion in employment and small establishments. Table 4 based on the following specification:
This specification essentially takes the difference between the specifications in Table 3 Panels A and B and runs an OLS estimation. The first differencing would deal with unobserved MSA fixed effects, such as static metropolitan area growth potentials. However, first differencing a dynamic framework mechanically introduces endogeneity if the error terms are correlated over time, a very likely scenario.
Hence, one should examine Table 4 with such caveat in mind.
The coefficient estimates are considerably smaller than those observed in Table 3 . For instance, the coefficient estimate on employment growth in Table 4 column (1) is 0.12 compared to 0.16 and 0.23
in Table 3 column (1). Similarly, the coefficient estimates are smaller for payroll growth and wage growth. I use average establishment size to proxy for entrepreneurship in Table 5 Table 5 confirms that cities with smaller establishments on average have higher economic growth as previously found in the literature.
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Homestead Exemption Levels as Instrumental Variables and 2SLS Results
If there are unobserved time varying MSA level growth potentials that are correlated with entrepreneurship, then dealing with MSA fixed effects by first-differencing would not be sufficient for obtaining unbiased estimates. For example, if potential entrepreneurs perceive that a city will be increasingly favorable for future growth and start businesses, then the endogeneity concern remains. To further deal with such possibility, I estimate the impact of entrepreneurship on urban growth using the homestead exemption levels in 1975 as instrumental variables. When a non-incorporated business is no longer financially viable, the debt of the business becomes personal liability of the business owner and he or she can file for personal bankruptcy. 
where i indexes for MSAs and s for states. Two conditions are needed for the above set of homestead exemption level variables to serve as a valid instrument for entrepreneurship. The first is that exemption levels need to impact entrepreneurship. The literature provides direct evidence on this relationship. Fan and White (2003) discuss how higher exemption levels serve as a wealth insurance and induce risk averse potential entrepreneurs to start a business. They empirically confirm this using household level data.
Rohlin and Ross (2015) uses the discontinuity in exemption levels across state borders and find that states with higher exemption levels attract more new businesses and also have positive effects on existing businesses. Similarly, I will find strong evidence that more generous homestead exemption increases small business births in MSA's. (4) with the homestead exemption variables in equation (6) used as instruments.
Panel A presents the first stage of the 2SLS estimation. Columns (1) to (3) examine the impact of the
unlimited exemption variable on small business births. Focusing on the specification that includes the initial establishment controls and census division fixed effects in column (3), small business births are eleven percent higher in metropolitan areas with unlimited exemption versus not. Columns (4) to (6) add the continuous log exemption level variable. In column (6) the coefficient estimates on both instruments are positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. A doubling of the exemption level increases small business birth by about 0.6%. The first stage F-statistics are above 10 in all specifications.
4 Table 6 Panels B through D present the 2SLS results on employment, payroll, and wage growth.
Columns (1) through (3) use the unlimited exemption variable as the instrument and Columns (4) through (6) use both variables in the instrument set. Focusing on the specification with the full set of control variables and fixed effects in column (3), a 10% increase in small business birth in 1993 leads to 2.2% more employment, 4% higher total annual payroll, and 1.8% higher wages after 10 years. When both instrumental variables are used in column (6), a 10% increase in small business birth leads to 1.1% more employment, 3.1% higher total annual payroll, and 2% higher wages after 10 years. The employment effect drops a bit in column (6) and loses statistical significance. The 2SLS estimates are generally smaller in magnitude than the OLS estimates with the same specifications. The positive bias in the OLS estimates indicates that unobserved MSA growth potential is positively correlated with small business births.
Note that the 2SLS estimates implicitly assume that the variation in the homestead exemption levels impacts the number of births but not the average entrepreneurial ability in each MSA. However, it is unlikely to be the case. Consider a distribution of entrepreneurial ability in a city. If homestead exemption serves as a wealth insurance as in Fan and White (2003) , cities with higher exemption will see more new businesses. Depending on whether the marginal entrepreneur's entrepreneurial ability is greater or lower than the existing average entrepreneurial ability in the city, the 2SLS estimate on the number of entrepreneurship may over or understate the true impact. If higher homestead exemption renders the marginal entrepreneur to be of lower ability than the average, the 2SLS estimates in Table 6 is likely a lower bound. On the other hand, if higher homestead exemption renders the marginal entrepreneur to be of higher ability than the average, the 2SLS estimates in Table 6 are likely greater than the true impact. 5 I do not have data to test which situation holds in this case. However, if we assume a model where the Table 3 examines the impact of the homestead exemption variables on expansions by medium and large firms. Given that small business births and existing firm expansion are correlated within cities, I do find positive correlation between the instrumental variables and firm expansion. However, once I control for small business birth the impact of the homestead exemption variables on firm expansion goes away. 5 Note that this argument assumes a closed city or that all cities are identical. If entrepreneurs of different ability sort across cities to take advantage of higher homestead exemption, one would need to consider whether there is positive or negative selection across cities as well. I abstract away from this discussion. However, there is evidence that entrepreneurs disproportionately start their businesses in their hometowns (Michelacci and Silva, 2007) .
! decision to become an entrepreneur is non-decreasing in wealth and entrepreneurial ability, and that the additional wealth insurance from higher homestead exemption levels mostly impacts the contribution of wealth on start-up decision, then the marginal entrepreneur's ability would be lower than the average. 6 This would imply that the 2SLS estimates in Table 6 are lower bounds.
Aquifer Share as Instrumental Variable and 2SLS Results
The comprehensive set of OLS, first-difference, and 2SLS estimates provide convincing evidence that entrepreneurship indeed promotes urban growth. However, some may still worry that certain 
Suppose a potential entrepreneur's decision to start a business depends on the individual's wealth w and entrepreneurial ability a. Further assume that wealth w and entrepreneurial ability a are uniformly distributed across a two-dimensional space. I assume that the decision to become an entrepreneur is non-decreasing in wealth w and entrepreneurial ability a. Wealth captures both collateral used to start a business, as well as risk preference, so that higher w will imply a higher propensity to start a business. Higher entrepreneurial ability will also imply a higher propensity to start a business. Given w and a there will be an expected payoff for entrepreneurship and working for others. If the expected payoff of entrepreneurship is greater than the wage earnings, one will start a business. In other words, one can think of a simple decision rule that can be expressed as below:
!"!!" + !" < ! for some parameters ! and ! and cutoff c. ! !"#$!%$!"!&$ equals one for an entrepreneur and zero if one works for another. Depending on how higher exemption level might impact the relative importance of the two factors, i.e., the ratio !/!, the average ability of observed entrepreneurs in the metropolitan area will differ. If higher exemption serves as a wealth insurance and increases the relative importance of wealth, i.e., !/! increases, then average ability E(a) in the city will decrease.
! 48 Conterminous Unites States.
7 I use the data constructed by Burchfield et al. (2006) for the analysis.
The share of MSA overlaying aquifers range from 0 to 1 with a mean value of around 0.3. Table 7 Panel A examines how the aquifer share variable impacts small business births in MSAs.
Column (1) implies that a 10% increase in the aquifer share decreases small business births by 1.3%.
When I include the census division fixed effects in column (2), the impact drops to 0.8%. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Glaeser, Kerr, and Kerr's hypothesis that natural resource intensive regions crowd-out entrepreneurship is validated with ground water as well, in addition to mineral deposits. The 2SLS results using aquifer share as the instrumental variable is presented in Panels B through D. A 10 percent increase in small business birth increases employment by 2.1% after 10 years in column (1) and by 1.8% in column (2). The estimate is statistically significant in column (1).
Note that these estimates are quite similar to the 2SLS estimates that use homestead exemption as instrumental variables. Despite the two being very different instrumental variables the estimates are surprisingly similar.
The subsequent columns in Table 7 use both the aquifer share variable and homestead exemption variables as instrumental variables. In Panel A the negative impact of aquifer share on small business birth remains strong and significant. The homestead exemption variables positively impact small business births and the F-statistic is greater than 10 other than in column (6). The 2SLS estimates on employment growth in Panel B range from 0.13 to 0.26, and are quite similar in range to the estimates in Table 6 .
Payroll results in Panel C are larger in magnitude than the employment estimates like before, and are all statistically significant. The range of estimates is also similar to the payroll results in Table 6 Panel B.
The fact that two very different sets of instrumental variables, the homestead exemption variables and the aquifer variable, return statistically significant results similar in magnitude is quite reassuring.
The consistency of the 2SLS results in Tables 6 and 7 further support the causal impact of small business births on urban economic growth. Table 8 presents results when average establishment size is used to proxy for entrepreneurship.
Average Establishment Size Results
Column ( Focusing on column (1), a 10 percent decrease in average establishment size in 1993 is associated with 2.7 percent higher employment, 4.9 percent higher payroll, and 2.2 percent higher wages after 10 years.
These 2SLS estimates on average establishment size are larger in magnitude compared to the OLS estimates in Table 5 where a 10 percent decrease in average establishment size was associated with 1.8 percent higher employment, 2.3 percent higher payroll, and 0.4 percent higher wages after 10 years.
Recall that the 2SLS estimates on small business births were smaller in magnitude than the OLS estimates.
The fact that the 2SLS estimates change relative to the OLS estimates in opposite directions depending on which entrepreneurship variable is used is actually intuitive. The main omitted variable, unobserved MSA growth potential, is likely positively correlated with small business births, and thus negatively correlated with average establishment size. 
Robustness Checks
Lastly, I further explore the robustness of the 2SLS estimates to various inclusions of state or MSA characteristics. One concern is whether other unobserved state business environment is driving the results. In Table 9 
The Agglomeration Benefits of Entrepreneurship
The OLS, first difference, and instrumental variable estimates all indicate that entrepreneurship contributes to urban growth. In this section, I examine whether the growth impact of entrepreneurship is simply due to the growth in the newly created businesses or whether there are agglomeration benefits, i.e., growth associated with other firms in the economy. A 10 percent increase in small establishment birth in 1993 translates to about 139 more births at the mean. Using the preferred 2SLS estimates from Table 6 column (3) and Table 7 column (2), i.e., the specifications with the full set of variables and fixed effects and strong first-stages, this would generate about 1.3 to 2.2% more employment ten years later, which amounts to 3,277 to 5,546 more jobs. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that about a third of new establishments survive after 10 years. 8 If I assume all of the employment increase came from the new businesses created in 1993 it would imply that on average each surviving business increased employment by 71 to 120. Unfortunately, I do not know the average employment growth of new businesses that survive after 10 years and hence cannot make a direct comparison. However, in the 1992-1993 period, there were 564,504 firm births in the less than 20 employee category, which in aggregate created 3,438,106 jobs in the U.S. This returns on average 6.1 employees per new small business created in 1993.
If the average new business that survives after ten years is unlikely to grow from 6.1 employees to 77 to 126 employees, the results here imply substantial agglomeration benefits from entrepreneurship.
Examining payroll growth provides another evidence of the agglomeration benefits of entrepreneurship. A 10 percent increase in entrepreneurship causes 2.4 to 4.0% higher annual payroll after 10 years, which translates to $157,296,000 to $262,149,600 in 1993 dollars. If this increase were distributed solely to the newly created employment (using the average of 4,412) each employee would get an annual pay of around $48,000 in 1993 dollars. Given that the average pay for employees working in small establishments in 2002 was $30,004 ($617,583,597,000/20,583,371 employees) in 2002 dollars or $24,100 in 1993 dollars, there seems to be substantial spill over effects of entrepreneurship to other firms in the economy. This simple accounting exercise suggests that there indeed are agglomeration benefits to urban entrepreneurship.
Conclusion
Entrepreneurship is widely believed to be a main source of economic growth. This paper The unit of analysis is the MSA and the number of observations is 316. Establishment births for 1993 are counted between March 1992 and March 1993. The "small business births" variable includes all new firm creation and expansions by firms with less than 20 employees. The "establishment birth by existing medium firms" variable refers to expansion by firms with 20-499 employees. The "establishment birth by existing large firms" variable refers expansion by firms with over 500 employees. Base controls are the initial period employment, income, population, education, and house price variables. Initial establishment controls are the three initial period numbers of establishments by size variables. There are nine census division fixed effects variables. The dependent variable is the change in log total MSA employment between 1993 and 2002 in Panel A, the change in log total annual payroll, which includes all wages, salary, bonuses, and benefits between 1993 and 2002 in Panel B, and the change in wage, which is payroll divided by employment, in Panel C. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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The unit of analysis is the MSA and the number of observations is 316. Establishment births for year t are counted between March of year t-1 and March of year t. The "small business births" variable includes all new firm creation and expansions by firms with less than 20 employees. The "establishment birth by existing medium firms" variable refers to expansion by firms with 20-499 employees. The "establishment birth by existing large firms" variable refers expansion by firms with over 500 employees. Base controls are the initial period employment, income, population, education, and house price variables. Initial establishment controls are the three initial period numbers of establishments by size variables. The nine census divisions are used in the fixed effects. Panel A examines the five years growth between 1993 and 1998. Panel B examines the five years growth between 1997 and 2002. The dependent variables are the change in log total MSA employment, the change in log total annual payroll, which includes all wages, salary, bonuses, and benefits, and the change in wage, which is payroll divided by employment. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The unit of analysis is the MSA and the number of observations is 316. The dependent variables are the change in employment, payroll, and wage growth. Establishment births for year t are counted between March of year t-1 and March of year t. Establishment per employee is the number of establishments divided by the number of employees in the MSA. The "small business births" variable includes all new firm creation and expansions by firms with less than 20 employees. The "establishment birth by existing medium firms" variable refers to expansion by firms with 20-499 employees. The "establishment birth by existing large firms" variable refers expansion by firms with over 500 employees. Base controls include the change in log employment, payroll, population, and house price index, and the 1990 percent college educated and log median family income. Initial establishment controls are the change in the three initial establishment variables. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The unit of analysis is the MSA and the number of observations is 316. Average establishment size is the number of employees divided by the number of establishments in the MSA. Panel A examines the 10 years growth in employment, payroll, an wages. Panels B and C examines the 5 years growth. Panel D examines the change in the 5 years growths. Panels A, B, and C include the initial period employment, income, population, education, house price variables, and the census division fixed effects. Panel D includes the change in employment, income, population, education, and house price variables. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The "small business births" variable includes all new firm creation and expansions by firms with less than 20 employees. Base controls are initial employment, median family income, population, percent college degree and above, and the house price index. Initial establishment controls are the three log number of establishment variables. The nine census divisions are used in the fixed effects. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics are reported as the 1 st stage F-statistics. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Table 8 
